Context:

Amitav Acharya, Distinguished Professor at American University, has for over a decade been a leading voice in International Relations and global politics. He introduced the concept of the “multiplex world” and, in addition to his contributions to IR theory, has authored several books on world politics, including The Once and the Future World Order (2025). His central argument is that non-Western civilizations; India, China, and Africa, have long contributed to international order. As Western dominance declines, he sees the emergence of a more inclusive, multiplex world order. On February 19, 2026, he gave a wide-ranging interview to Ross Douthat, The New York Times, who asked probing questions on the changing dynamics of world order. Acharya expressed confidence and intellectual conviction in advancing the proposition that “the future is Indian.” He situated this claim within a deep historical narrative while recognizing the complex interconnections among trade, commerce, security, economy, demography, and diaspora in the contemporary global order. Within this framework, he reflected on the evolving roles of the United States and China in relation to India. How and why India-Russia strategic partnership continues to endure? Why China- Pakistan partnership is irksome for India? Does U.S and the West, expect India to defend democracy and capitalist world order that is why the Future is Indian? Let me focus on three broad themes: the role of the Indian diaspora across the United States and Europe, U.S-China competition plus paralysis in Europe and India’s prospects as a global power with reference to 1971 India- Pakistan war.

India, China and the U.S:

Taking a longitudinal view of history, Acharya argues that Indian civilization historically extended from the Indus to the Steppes and Persia, invoking the civilizational dimension of Indian power much as, very much as China does. Differentiating the Chinese and Indian paths to economic development and political prominence, he noted that in the 1950s India appeared to possess comparable potential, but China subsequently surged ahead. Today, however, he suggests India can chart its course through appropriate development policies and integration into global supply chains. Having lived in China for twenty years, Acharya observes that China has transitioned from a low-cost manufacturing hub to a high-technology industrial state. He contends that China seeks to be number one and to replace the United States in the global order, even if it does not openly declare this ambition. By contrast, he argues that India does not aspire to that kind of dominance; rather, it seeks “status and respect” as a great power within the international community. This leaves one wondering about the benign and toothless nature of Indian power and that is not how India is perceived in the South Asian region.

Indian Diaspora, the Intellectual Powerhouse:

Acharya underscores the growing influence of the Indian diaspora as resilient enhancing India’s soft power. He views the diaspora’s skills and professionalism as significant assets. Indian diaspora’s prominence in the universities, media, arts and culture has empowered them in the U.S, UK and the Western world in general. In his assessment, opportunities for the Indian diaspora remain promising in Australia, Canada, and the United States. In Europe, however, he perceives a contraction of space and opportunity. The diaspora’s cultural presence and soft power reinforce the broader narrative of India’s rise and its global standing. Thus, Indian diaspora is Intellectual powerhouse in America and the Western world and equally well entrenched in their political systems.

1971 India- Pakistan war: Perceptions and Relations with China, the U.S and Russia

A third dimension of the interview concerns the 1971 India–Pakistan war and the enduring warmth in India towards Russia. Though an American/Canadian citizen of Indian descent, Acharya described 1971 as a “turning point,” recalling how President Nixon and Henry Kissinger deployed the Seventh Fleet in the Bay of Bengal, prompting India to conclude a defense treaty with the Soviet Union. “So that memory remains,” Acharya recalls it “historical” and “sentimental” memory. Growing up in India during the Soviet era, he elicits that India viewed the Soviet Union as friendly and benign—certainly more so than many former colonial powers or even the United States. That perception, he suggests, has had lasting influence and these sentiments are often difficult for Americans and Western observers to fully comprehend.

He maintains that India was historically non-aligned and is now “multi-aligned.” Regarding Russia under Putin, he notes India’s energy dependence, though he considers this could also change. On China–Pakistan relations, he observes that Indians find Chinese support for Pakistan irksome, yet he argues that despite India’s ‘Pakistan problem’, India and China can sustain more cordial and transactional relations. He does not consider India and Pakistan as co-equals (taking into cognizance that both are nuclear powers) but is mindful that domestic challenges in both India and Pakistan sap national energies, and that any war between them would have devastating consequences not only for their human development trajectories but also could be harmful for China.

Concluding Thought

From the interview and other sources, it appears that the West, particularly the United States, views India as a potential torch bearer of democracy (not to worry how human rights and press freedom is being muzzled and assaulted in the U.S and India) and capitalism at a time when Western societies face demographic decline and relative retrenchment. With its youthful population and sustained economic growth, India is often seen as a possible alternative to China. Yet Acharya makes clear that India will not rely exclusively on the United States.

While the Indian diaspora projects intellectual influence, cultural presence, and soft power, India’s long-term prospects, if framed as “the future is Indian”, will remain constrained unless disputes with its neighbors, particularly Pakistan are addressed. Over the past two and a half decades, Indian diaspora intellectuals, in concert with American scholars and policymakers, have consistently advanced the theme of India’s rise as the world’s largest democracy and a vanguard of free markets and globalization. This sustained march of ideas, reflected in a growing body of scholarly work, invites continued examination of whether—and in what sense—the future may indeed be Indian.