

Re-inventing Pakistan: Islam, Security and Democracy—What is Changing?

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This essay analyses the changing dynamics of Islam, the military and democracy.

I will argue that the composition and support base of the religious parties, the military and the elected public officials has undergone a transformation, and that new coalitions are emerging which are changing the face of Pakistani politics and society. The religious parties, the military and the elected public officials are preoccupied with considerations of power and state security rather than economic reform. The predicament for the military and the Musharraf-Jamali regime is how to reconcile the security imperatives of the state with democratic expectations of its citizens. The new alliances and coalitions that the military has built to chart the course of democratic process in Pakistan do not breed much confidence among Pakistan-watchers. Why?

In post-9/11 Pakistan, General Musharraf is faced with challenges similar to the civilian government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1971-77) in 1972—namely, how to ensure the security of the state, deal with the resurgent religious right and build democratic processes? Bhutto softened confrontation with India and built a framework of peace through the

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Simla Agreement (July 1972). He refurbished the alliance with the United States and sought accommodation with the religious right. The challenge then and now is how to reinvent and redefine Pakistan. Bhutto-Musharraf speeches on “enlightened moderation” and on Islamic political discourse evoke interesting comparisons; Bhutto in the 1970s and Musharraf now have roused expectations about a liberal, progressive, forward-looking and “moderate Muslim” Pakistan, but both did little in building coalitions with the liberal socio-political forces and sought appeasement and

accommodation with the religious right. This is the paradox of liberal/modernist leadership in Pakistan.

I will argue two basic propositions. First, on the rise of the Muttahida- Majlis-e-Amala (MMA), most of the analysts argue that the military regime manipulated its rise. They argue that the military-mullah connection has been pivotal in facilitating the rise of the religious groups. The military-mullah argument, weighty and persuasive as it may be, overlooks an important fact—the disarray of liberal social-political forces represented by the PPP, PML (N) and ANP. Not only did these parties fail to make meaningful coalitions, they also disintegrated into factions. Despite a popular appeal and support base these parties could neither develop a coherent program nor an alternate coalition strategy. Second, the role of the military and composition of top military brass have undergone a transformation. The army has gradually moved away from the Huntingtonian model of professionalism confined to state security and primacy of civilian control to a Janowitzian model of “constabulary military” where interstate wars have been rare but cross-border insurgency and internal law enforcement have become the military’s key function. In most scholarly studies, the political role of the Pakistani military has been a primary focus of analysis. Its peacekeeping, intelligence and counter-intelligence roles have not received adequate attention. I will provide some conjectural evidence and analysis on how these roles may have transformed the outlook of its officer corps.

I will argue that in the past three decades, a generation of military elites has emerged whose war experience is not that of “war between states” but a world view that was deeply shaped by the “new wars” organizing, supporting, training, equipping paramilitary groups (Afghan Jihad) and simultaneously combating/monitoring other paramilitary groups (peace missions—Haiti, Somalia, Cambodia, Bosnia, etc.). The military elites who

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came to dominate the decision-making power structure appeared enormously confident and convinced that for governance, political control and reform, they need not depend on the civil bureaucracy. Rather they must establish the military’s hegemony.

SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE: AN OVERVIEW, 1972-2004

How are religion and security intertwined and what impact has this had on governance? War, conflict and perceptions about regional insecurity could bring religious zealots and the military together. Pakistan makes an interesting case study. In the 1970 elections, the defeat of the religious political parties was followed by the defeat and dismemberment of Pakistan. However, in the “new” Pakistan, neither the role of the military nor that of the religious political parties diminished. Both remained a potent force. The religious groups were in disarray, but they had a clear goal—to

maximize their power. To attain this they demanded the Islamization of laws and succeeded in securing more Islamic clauses in the 1973 constitution than in any previous constitution of Pakistan. In a constitutional/legal sense it was a major victory, but in the parliament and general power structure, the religious groups remained on the periphery. The constitutional changes gave a sense of confidence, legitimized their role and enhanced their power. The religious-political parties won on the Islamization of the constitutional provisions but their broad thrust has been restricting personal freedoms, subordination of women and minorities and enhancing the role of ulema in the Pakistani power structure.

The coming into power of the PPP under the leadership of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1971–77) as the prime minister of Pakistan was a frustrating experience for the religious right, particularly the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI). It was also an unwelcome outcome for the military. The two had fostered a partnership during the military regime of General Yahya Khan (1969–71). Th

e dismemberment of Pakistan shook the very foundations of this partnership. It was a watershed event in Pakistani history. Both accepted the authority of the PPP government reluctantly and grudgingly. While Bhutto was swift in purging the army top brass and after appointing General Tikka Khan as chief of army staff (COAS) in March 1972, he felt secure and comfortable but his control over the military remained precarious.

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The religious right was vociferous in attacking the Bhutto government as “un-Islamic” and demanded enforcement of the *Shariah* laws. Bhutto responded by a twin policy of appeasement and coercion. For example, while adopting the 1973 constitution he showed flexibility in incorporating the Islamic clauses, yet, he resorted to coercive measures and suspended the publication of a number of pro-Jamaat newswEEKlies and papers. Despite appeasement and coercion, Bhutto could not completely subdue the religious right, which remained a potent oppositional force against the government. In early 1977, when the PPP government held elections but failed to demonstrate the fairness of these, the religious right provided the lead and banded together and formed the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). The PNA demanded enforcement of *Shariah* laws and Bhutto conceded to many of these demands. Yet the religious right demanded his government’s resignation and incited the army to overthrow the PPP government. The confrontation between the PPP and PNA, street protests, loss of life and property encouraged the military takeover.

The military regime under General Zia ul-Haq rejuvenated the partnership between the religious right and the military. Besides, domestic factors and changes in the external regional environment—turmoil in Afghanistan, Islamic revolution in Iran and finally Soviet intervention in Afghanistan—galvanized the Islamic revivalist movement in Pakistan, facilitating the proliferation of Deeni Madarrassah (religious schools) and training camps. Now there is considerable evidence showing how the United States and Saudi Arabia funnelled money, equipment and training to militant Islamic groups

who were mobilized to wage a war against Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. These internal and external conditions led to the formation of a nexus between the militant Islamic groups and the military regime.

During the Zia era (1977-88), Pakistan's involvement in the Afghan war deepened, while internally the regime launched a policy of the Islamization of laws, polity, economy and society in Pakistan. Supporting the Afghan war had implications for Pakistan. It not only had to accommodate more than 2 million Afghan refugees, but also harbor various international Islamic groups who were mobilized to wage and sustain Afghan Jihad. These holy warriors began to cultivate relations with Islamic groups who were small in size but deeply entrenched in Pakistan's power structure. Thus Afghan Jihad and the Islamization of the Pakistani state grew simultaneously and supplemented each other.

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With the signing of the Geneva Accords in 1988, the United States embarked on a policy of disengagement from Afghan Jihad. However, Pakistan's president Zia ul-Haq, who had vigorously supported the jihad, felt that the U.S. disengagement was premature and jeopardized the prospects of installing a government led by the Afghan Mujahideen. Zia had come to believe that the United States had reached an agreement with the Soviet Union and no longer needed Pakistan's support. Instead, by eliciting the support of the Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo on the Geneva Accords, the United States was aiming to discredit the Pakistani military, which had successfully organized the Afghan resistance movement. Zia and his military associates who had engineered and sustained the Afghan war were completely left out of the Geneva Accords. The U.S. disengagement left the Pakistani military, the various Afghan factions and the religious groups to their own devices.

From 1988 to 1994, Afghanistan underwent a civil war as various factions struggled to establish their control over Kabul. The military and religious groups in Pakistan began to reposition themselves for the installation of a pro-Pakistan government in Kabul. Besides the Afghan civil war, another factor, the uprising in Indian-held Kashmir in 1989, contributed towards reinvigorating the partnership between the military and religious groups in Pakistan. Confident of success in the Afghan resistance, the military found it convenient to mobilize the religious groups to support the Kashmir uprising. They encouraged the religious groups to provide sanctuary, and training and built connections with the militant religious groups. During 1980s and 1990s, Pakistan witnessed the proliferation of militant religious groups. These groups, hardened in the Afghan war, built extraterritorial connections and indulged in transnational wars. The Afghanistan war and Kashmir uprising deepened the already stable connection between the military and the Jihadi groups in Pakistan.

In the wake of the infamous terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, Pakistan was compelled to revise and reformulate its Afghan and Kashmir policies. After joining the

international coalition against terrorism in October 2001, governance is no longer only an internal issue for Pakistan; it has acquired international overtones and salience. Pakistan embarked upon a policy of providing logistical support, use of air space and intelligence cooperation with the United States. This has given new meaning to governance, where the Federal Bureau of Investigation,

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Central Intelligence Agency, and Special Services Group have launched programs of cooperation and training for Pakistani counterparts. The collaboration between Pakistan and U.S. on issues of governance and counter-terrorism has had two consequences: first, it strained and severed the linkages between the religious groups and the military, and second, it has evoked fierce resistance from the Jihadi groups and remnants of the Taliban. In the light of these circumstances, the challenge before the Musharraf military regime was how to redefine relations with the religious groups and the parameters of security.

COALITIONS OF RELIGIOUS PARTIES: WHY AND HOW?

As noted above, in the last three decades, the politics of coalition-building and interest aggregation has replaced the politics of mass mobilization and mass agitation in Pakistan. This is best reflected in voter turnouts, political apathy, and decline or death of party workers (*jiala*) leading to the de-institutionalization of political parties. Ironically, political parties fragmented at a faster rate during 1985–99, as Pakistan made a transition to electoral democracy. During this period, domestic conditions and the external environment proved conducive for the religious political parties, which devised new methods to expand the political role of Islam in Pakistani society and culture. The religious political parties and groups expanded their support base among the trader–merchant classes in the Punjab, NWFP and Karachi.

The roots of recent successful coalition-building efforts by the religious political parties can be traced from the formation of the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) in 1977—an alliance that comprised nine political parties and which was dominated by Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), Jamiat-ul-Ulema-Islam (JUI), and Jamiat-ul-Ulema-Pakistan (UP). The 1977 PNA movement against the Z.A. Bhutto government was a catalyst for strategizing the coalition politics of religious parties. During this movement, the Juma Prayers (Friday congregations) were used as an effective tool to mobilize the population; the *Masjid* (mosque) was transformed into a focal point of networking and mass mobilization. The *Masjid* began to be increasingly used as vanguard for political messages while madrassas developed into sanctuaries of religious indoctrination and training. From the PNA movement the religious parties learned that for instrumentalizing Islam, the

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politicization of the mosque is essential. In the urban canters, Jamaat-e- Islami spearheaded the movement and built coalitions with the JUP and the JUI, which both had effective control over the mosques.

During 1979-89 the religious parties, particularly JI, collaborated with the military regime in the Afghan jihad. During the 1990s sectarian conflicts compelled the religious parties to address the problem. This led to the creation of another coalition dominated by the religious parties in March 1995—the Milli Yakjehati Council (MYC), a coalition of over 15 religious parties. However, the Council fell apart when JUI(F) and JUI(S) developed differences. It had limited success in curbing sectarian violence. During the 1997 elections the JI made an unsuccessful attempt to convert MYC into an electoral alliance. In 2000, led by JUI(F) 29 religious groups formed yet another coalition—Islamic Muttahida Mahaaz (IMAM). This was regional in character, focusing on NWFP and Baluchistan. IMAM was vociferously anti-American, attacked the NGO's particularly women's groups and indulged in destroying and disrupting satellite and cable net- works in the NWP and Baluchistan.

Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman JUI(F) at Peshawar organized the Deoband Conference in June 2000. The conference was attended by many scholars from a number of Muslim countries. Reportedly over a million people from all over Pakistan attended it. The MYC, IMAM, and Deoband Conference were precursors to the Pak-Afghan Defense Council (PADC) formed in October 2001—a coalition of 30 religious parties. Events subsequent to the World Trade Center attacks provided a rallying point for the religious parties to band together in opposition to actions taken by Musharraf and later by the United States. For a variety of reasons, the PADC could not act in a unified manner or define a coherent agenda against the military regime. Ultimately, a trimmed-down PADC became the MMA election alliance (Qazi Hussain Ahmed claims it was formed at his residence in June 2002).

While participating in the October 2002 elections, the MMA demonstrated greater flexibility and pragmatism while making seat adjustments. It was skilful in cultivating an image among the voters that since it is a coalition of six Sunni and Shi'a religious parties its victory may curb sectarian-ism, and to a limited degree it did. In the one year after joining the ruling coalition at the national and provincial level, it has demonstrated that it aims to stay in power and is willing to make bargains and compromises.

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NEW SOCIAL GROUPS

These are groups, social classes and leaders who emerged during Zia's years and expanded their power base during the decade of the 1990s as Pakistan struggled with the consolidation of electoral democracy. These groups banded together for ideological, social, class and attitudinal reasons. These groups have generally opposed

the politics of mass mobilization and shown preference for coalition-building and interest protection.

In collaboration with the military they found it prudent to pursue and protect the interests of their support groups through coalition formation—increasing reliance on Briadari (clan), tribal affiliations and religious right. The PML(Q) and MMA coalition needs to be seen in that context. My preliminary research on the outcome of the 2001 Local Bodies election and 2002 election results seems to suggest that the socio-economic and educational base of the elected representatives has undergone some change. The landowning groups and tribal leaders continue to dominate, but trader-merchant classes, business groups and middle class representation has marginally increased. More significant is the emergence of a younger generation of elected representatives from the old established political families. The introduction of an educational qualification clause has contributed to the rise of a small but new breed of elected public officials. Do changes in the socio-economic base and education promote liberal democratic values? The conduct, behavior and performance of parliamentary politics do not show a positive correlation.

CHANGING COMPOSITION OF THE MILITARY AND BUREAUCRATIC ELITES

The generation of officers who have emerged as the decision makers in the post-1999 period entered service in early and mid-1960s. As young officers, they got the opportunity to participate in the September 1965 war. These officers were still in the formative phase of their careers when they saw another war. In a way, the top rank of the current military regime and officers were recruited into service between the two wars of 1965 and 1971. Most of the corps commanders are urban-based, educated in the colleges of Lahore, Peshawar, Rawalpindi, and Karachi. It must also be kept in view that the period between the two wars was a very turbulent period in the

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history of Pakistan. Therefore, their worldview is shaped by the events and circumstances of that period. However, their professional advancement, operational skills and interaction with higher levels of security policy making formed during Zia regime. Most of the current corps commanders and staff officers were serving as majors and colonels, and the Zia years' deep involvement of Pakistan army in Afghanistan war had an enormous impact on the thinking, outlook, and orientation of the officers and ranks.

During these years, closer involvement in Afghan affairs, although confined to a limited number of officers but encompassing the overall involvement of the army, led to the merging of professional skills with motivational dimensions (Islamic ideology/the Jihad Syndrome). The Afghan war considerably diffused the pattern of martial, non-martial race generals. The pattern began to tilt towards an urban, "non-martial race" breed of officer, a change that has considerably diluted the dominance of

the so-called “martial races” in the higher commands and could be regarded as a major transformation in the traditional composition and outlook of the army’s high command. Evidently, the urban-based generals have shown greater pragmatism in making a transition from a professional role to a constabulary/managerial role. However, the worldview of these officers, particularly on issues related to security, appears to have been considerably influenced by the policies and legacies of the Zia years.

The regime has been more than enthusiastic in appointing military officers in top administrative positions. Over 800 hundred retired and serving officers above the rank of brigadiers have been appointed to various senior civil administration positions. There are three methods through which military officers are inducted into civilian positions. First, serving officers are given prize posts in government corporations and semi-autonomous organizations (PIA, WAPDA, NSC, vice chancellors, think tanks). Second, retired officers are recommended by the service headquarters for re-employment. Third, since 1980, through induction each year, 6–11 officers are recruited in three elite CSS services—the DMG, Police and Foreign Service. In addition, in the lower level government jobs (grade 1–15), retired ex-servicemen are given jobs.

The social class, educational background, professional experience and ideological orientation of the military top brass have also been undergoing changes. First, the Afghan war expanded the Pakistan military’s intelligence and insurgency/counter insurgency role and experience. This

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resulted in deepening its already well-entrenched position in domestic politics as “policeman.” Second, the collapse of the Soviet Union provided yet another opportunity to enhance the peacekeeping role and functions of Pakistan military. It is recognized as the largest UN peacekeeping military in the UN operations. The UN peacekeeping exposure established the professional reputation of its soldiers and officer corps. Third, lack of trust and absence of consensus among the political parties and allegations of corruption during civilian rule between 1988–99 tarnished the image and functioning of political parties. All these developments led to the expansion of a “policing” role of the military.

The overstretch in the policing functions of the military has eroded the credibility of the military as an institution. In 1997, a survey was sponsored by the United States Information Agency through a consultancy firm to evaluate the public confidence in different institutions—judiciary, bureaucracy, political parties, military. Not too surprisingly over 80 percent of the respondents held the military in the highest esteem and considered it the most credible institution. However, if a survey were conducted today to measure the credibility of the military in the public eye, it would certainly be

low, if not totally disappointing. Media reports of job grabbing and financial corruption by the military have considerably tarnished its image and reputation in the public eye.

The composition of the higher bureaucracy (the Civil Services of Pakistan) has undergone considerable transformation. Four unrelated developments are changing the character and composition of higher civil service in Pakistan. First, the Local Bodies Plan 2001 and its implementation; second, foreign training opportunities; third, the UN peacekeeping and policing postings in Balkans, Sierra Leone, East Timor, etc; fourth, NGOs have provided consultancy opportunities to the civil servants, encouraging many to take temporary leave and deputation from the service. The District Management Group (DMG) has been adversely affected by the Local Bodies 2001 Plan. Its prestige, power and glory has been undermined by the dissolution of the office of the Deputy Commissioner-district as the lynchpin of administration. After initial dismay and resistance, the DMG officers have found alternate ways to enhance their professional skills and restore lost power by seeking foreign scholarships and training abroad. The trend had begun in the early 1990s, when the British government expanded the Chevening training program for Civil Services and professionals in

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Pakistan. Since 1996 on an average 25-30 officers under the age of 40 have acquired some kind of training—resulting in a segment of civil servants better educated and professionally qualified but not necessarily satisfied with work conditions and the environment. In the post-2001 period, the expansion of Humphrey Hayes and the revival of USAID and other programs have provided fresh opportunities of training to the higher civil services. The IMF-sponsored PIFFERA project with the Central Board of Revenue (CBR) has been functioning for some years. For example, in 2003, 25 officers from grade 18-20 received short-term training in Canada.

The foregoing analysis of the changing composition of the military- bureaucratic elites and elected public officials and the ascendancy of the religious parties demonstrates that the dynamics of politics are undergoing transformation. However, the dynamics of these changes are not necessarily facilitating a balanced institutional development, thus constricting the prospects of democratic governance. The future of democracy and consolidation of democratic institutions in the country hinges on the disengagement of the military from civil sectors, revival, sustenance and restoring the legitimacy of mainstream political parties, and professionalization of the civil service.

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9:00

9:10-11:00

CONFERENCE AGENDA

WELCOMING COMMENTS

Robert M. Hathaway, director, Asia Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

PANEL I: PAKISTAN AND AN ISLAMIC ECONOMY—THE PRIVATE SECTOR

Islamization of Economy—Pakistani Experiences

Khurshid Ahmad, Institute of Policy Studies, Islamabad

Islamization and Private Enterprise: Can the Two Work Together?

Shahid Javed Burki, EMP Financial Advisors

The Impact of Islamization on Women

Isobel Coleman, Council on Foreign Relations **Moderator: Munawar Z. Noorani**, chairman,

Fellowship Fund for Pakistan

PANEL II: PAKISTAN AND AN ISLAMIC ECONOMY—INSTITUTIONS AND THE GOVERNMENTAL SECTOR

Riba and the Superior Courts

Charles Kennedy, Wake Forest University

Islamization, the State and Development

Vali Nasr, The Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey | 131 |

11:15–1:00

1:00–2:45

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The Profit Motive in Islam—Which Types of Institutions Can Support or Hinder Markets?

Omar Noman

Moderator: William B. Milam, senior policy scholar, Woodrow Wilson Center

LUNCH

Luncheon Address: Islamization and the Pakistan Economy

Ishrat Husain, governor, State Bank of Pakistan

PANEL III: THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF AN ISLAMIC ECONOMY

Poverty and Social Justice: Some Challenges for Islamization in Pakistan
Parvez Hasan, World Bank

Reinventing Pakistan: Islam, Security and Democracy— What is Changing?
Saeed Shafqat, Columbia University

Moderator: Dennis Kux, senior policy scholar, Woodrow Wilson Center

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

Akbar Ahmed, American University

4:45–5:00


Conference Agenda

This program was made possible through the generous support of the Fellowship Fund for Pakistan.

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One Woodrow Wilson Plaza 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20004-3027



Asia Program

ISLAMIZATION AND THE PAKISTANI ECONOMY

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