Re-inventing Pakistan: Islam, Security and Democracy—What is Changing?

Re-inventing Pakistan: Islam, Security and Democracy—What is Changing?

This essay analyses the changing dynamics of Islam, the military and democracy. I will argue that the composition and support base of the religious parties, the military and the elected public officials has undergone a transformation, and that new coalitions are emerging which are changing the face of Pakistani politics and society. The religious parties, the military and the elected public officials are preoccupied with considerations of power and state security rather than economic reform. The predicament for the military and the Musharraf-Jamali regime is how to reconcile the security imperatives of the state with democratic expectations of its citizens. The new alliances and coalitions that the military has built to chart the course of democratic process in Pakistan do not breed much confidence among Pakistan-watchers. Why?

In post-9/11 Pakistan, General Musharraf is faced with challenges similar to the civilian government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1971-77) in 1972—namely, how to ensure the security of the state, deal with the resurgent religious right and build democratic processes? Bhutto softened confrontation with India and built a framework of peace through the Simla Agreement (July 1972). He refurbished the alliance with the United States and sought accommodation with the religious right. The challenge then and now is how to reinvent and redefine Pakistan. Bhutto-Musharraf speeches on “enlightened moderation” and on Islamic political discourse evoke interesting comparisons; Bhutto in the 1970s and Musharraf now have roused expectations about a liberal, progressive, forward-looking and “moderate Muslim” Pakistan, but both did little in building coalitions with the liberal socio-political forces and sought appeasement and accommodation with the religious right. This is the paradox of liberal/modernist leadership in Pakistan.

I will argue two basic propositions. First, on the rise of the Muttahida- Majlis-e-Amala (MMA), most of the analysts argue that the military regime manipulated its rise. They argue that the military-mullah connection has been pivotal in facilitating the rise of the religious groups. The military-mullah argument, weighty and persuasive as it may be, overlooks an important fact—the disarray of liberal social-political forces represented by the PPP, PML (N) and ANP. Not only did these parties fail to make meaningful coalitions, they also disintegrated into factions. Despite a popular appeal and support base these parties could neither develop a coherent program nor an alternate coalition strategy. Second, the role of the military and composition of top military brass have undergone a transformation. The army has gradually moved away from the Huntingtonian model of professionalism confined to state security and primacy of civilian control to a Janowitzian model of “constabulary military” where interstate wars have been rare but cross-border insurgency and internal law enforcement have become the military’s key function. In most scholarly studies, the political role of the Pakistani military has been a primary focus of analysis. Its peacekeeping, intelligence and counter-intelligence roles have not received adequate attention. I will provide some conjectural evidence and analysis on how these roles may have transformed the outlook of its officer corps.

I will argue that in the past three decades, a generation of military elites has emerged whose war experience is not that of “war between states” but a world view that was deeply shaped by the “new wars” organizing, supporting, training, equipping paramilitary groups (Afghan Jihad) and simultaneously combating/monitoring other paramilitary groups (peace missions—Haiti, Somalia, Cambodia, Bosnia, etc.). The military elites who came to dominate the decision-making power structure appeared enormously confident and convinced that for governance, political control and reform, they need not depend on the civil bureaucracy. Rather they must establish the military’s hegemony.

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